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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellants Mark and Geneve Cromar reply herein only to 
those new matters raised by Appellee Donald Dwyer not otherwise 
covered in their principal brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO RAISE 
ARGUMENTS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
A. Promissory Note. 
Cromars agree that appellate courts generally will not 
consider arguments relating to matters not raised in the pleadings 
nor put in issue at trial and which are presented for the first 
time on appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. Iversen, 848 P. 2d 677 (Utah 
1993); Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. National Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 
651, 657 (Utah 1988); Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493, 
494 (Utah 1983); Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 
1359 (Utah App. 1991); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
App. 1987). This clearly is not such a case. 
Dwyer contends that the Cromars are attempting to raise a new 
issue on appeal, namely that "The Cromars never contended in the 
court below that Dwyer had a duty to pay attorney's fees directly 
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to them under the terms of the note." (Brief of Appellee at 5.) 
Dwyer's characterization of Cromars' argument misses the point 
which is that Dwyer assumed the Note and agreed to indemnify 
Cromars for "any and all" obligations arising thereunder. 
(Agreement at 2d.) (Add. D.) 
The argument raised by the Cromars below and on appeal is that 
Dwyer's promise as expressly set forth in the Agreement Surviving 
Real Estate Closing was to hold them harmless, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, from any and all obligations contained in the 
Second Trust Deed and Note dated November 6, 1979. (Agreement, Add. 
D.) Thus, the underlying obligation referred to in the Agreement 
which forms the basis of this action was the Cromars' duty to pay 
Chaffins' principal, interest, and costs including reasonable 
attorney's fees if suit were brought on the Note, which obligation 
was assumed by Dwyer. (R. 29, 57.) Once judgment was entered in 
favor of Chaffins and against Cromars on the Note, Dwyer incurred 
the primary obligation to indemnify Cromars for their loss pursuant 
to the express terms of the Agreement, which incorporated the terms 
of the Note by reference. (Agreement at 2d.) (Add. D.) 
Cromars basic argument was raised in the pleadings stage of 
this action against Dwyer as follows: 
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Dwyer assumed the 
Note and held the Cromars harmless from any and all 
obligations under the Note, including reasonable 
attorneys fees. 
Third Party Complaint at para, 10- (R. 29) 
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Dwyer admitted this allegation in the Second Defense of his 
Answer (R. 57) and despite subsequent denials (R. 235), the court 
so found. (R. 261.) 
The argument was specifically presented to the court in 
Cromars' Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted except for 
an award of attorney's fees. (R. 155; 158-62; 253-55). 
Dwyer's contention that Cromars are raising a new argument in 
this regard misconstrues their position and lacks merit. 
B. Attorney's Fees. 
In the court below, the trial judge initially awarded the 
Cromars "such attorney's fees and costs against Dwyer as are 
supported by affidavit and as are awarded by the court." (R. 260-
62; Add. F.) The Cromars then submitted an Affidavit of Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs which contained a description of time spent both in 
the defense of the action by Chaffins and the prosecution of the 
summary judgment motion against Dwyer. (R. 303-07; Add. F.) The 
precise wording is as follows: 
(b) Attorneys' fees: 
(Factual investigation; preparation of 
documents, affidavits, pleadings, research and 
correspondence with respect to the defense of 
the action for summary judgment by Chaffins 
and the prosecution of the motion for summary 
judgment against Dwyer, including preparation 
of judgment and conferences with client and 
opposing counsel regarding the same). 
73.5 Total Hours 
TOTAL ATTORNEYS' FEES: $7,259.75 
Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (Add. F.) (Emphasis added.) 
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It is obvious from the text of the Affidavit quoted above that 
Cromars claimed attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the 
action against Chaffins in the court below. This is, therefore, 
hardly a new issue. Dwyer, however, only objected to those fees 
incurred in enforcing the Agreement. (R. 267-70; 294-99.) 
Cromars' arguments below were consequently designed to overcome 
this specific objection. (R. 286-91.) 
At no time did the Cromars waive their right to recover 
attorney's fees incurred in defending the action which were claimed 
from the outset. On the contrary, they have always maintained that 
they are entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred both for 
defense and enforcement purposes. Dwyer's contention to the 
contrary lacks merit on this point as well. 
II. 
THE RULE THAT A CONTRACT WILL BE CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE DRAFTER ONLY APPLIES IN CASES 
WHERE OTHER FACTORS ARE NOT DECISIVE. 
Dwyer argues that since the Agreement was drafted by the 
Cromars' agent, i.e., Paramount Title Corporation, any ambiguity 
therein must be construed in his favor. (Brief of Appellee at 7.) 
In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the 
Agreement was prepared by the Cromars or their agent. The Cromars 
did not select the terms of the contract or had any reason to know 
of uncertainties in its meaning. Conseguently, this rule of 
construction does not apply. See, Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 206 (1981). (Add. L.) 
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In this case, Cromars have demonstrated that the more 
reasonable interpretation of the Agreement favors the creation of 
an obligation to pay attorney's fees in addition to those covered 
by the Note, including enforcement of the Agreement itself. They 
have cited other factors such as the decisions of other courts 
interpreting similarly broad language to permit such recovery. 
Finally, they have advanced public policy reasons favoring the 
award. In short, this is not a case in which resort must be made 
to a rule of construction in order to break a tie between two 
reasonable meanings as contemplated by the rule. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised on this appeal were presented below and 
ruled upon by the trial court. Dwyer has failed to demonstrate why 
the Cromars should not be entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
in this case. The Summary Judgment of the lower court should be 
reversed insofar as it denies the Cromars' attorney's fees and the 
case remanded for a determination and award of such fees as are 
just. 
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DATED this <gTH day of December, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
Paul M. Durham 
G. Richard Hill 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 538-2424 
Attorneys for Appellants Mark 
and Geneve Croraar 
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ADDENDUM L 
Ch. 9 CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS § 2 0 6 
§ 2 0 6 . Interpretation Against the Draftsman 
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning 
is generally preferred which operates against the 
party who supplies the words or from whom a writing 
otherwise proceeds. 
Comment: 
a. Rationale. Where one party chooses the terms of a contract, 
he is likely to provide more carefully for the protection of his own 
interests than for those of the other party. He is also more likely than 
the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties of meaning. 
Indeed, he may leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending to de-
cide at a later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt, there-
fore, so long as other factors are not decisive, there is substantial rea-
son for preferring the meaning of the other party. The rule is often 
invoked in cases of standardized contracts and in cases where the 
drafting party has the stronger bargaining position, but it is not lim-
ited to such cases. It is in strictness a rule of legal effect, sometimes 
called construction, as well as interpretation: its operation depends on 
the positions of the parties as they appear in litigation, and sometimes 
the result is hard to distinguish from a denial of effect to an unconscion-
able clause. 
b. Compulsory contract or term. The rule that language is in-
terpreted against the party who chose it has no direct application to 
cases where the language is prescribed by law, as is sometimes true 
with respect to insurance policies, bills of lading and other standard-
ized documents. In some cases, however, the statute or regulation 
adopts language which was previously used without compulsion and 
was interpreted against the drafting party, and there is normally no 
intention to change the established meaning. Moreover, insurers are 
more likely than insureds to participate in drafting prescribed forms 
and to review them carefully before putting them into use. 
REPORTER'S NOTE 
This Section carries forward the 07 (2d Cir. 1970), quoting from this 
substance of former § 236(d). See 3 Comment in Tentative Draft; God-
Corbin, Contracts § 559 (1960 & dard v. South Bay Union High School 
Supp. 1980); 4 Williston, Contracts § Dist., 79 Cal. App.3d 98, 144 Cal. 
621 (3d ed. 1961). Rptr. 701 (1978); Pappas v. Bever, 
Comment a. On the general rule, 219 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1974). That it 
see, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. has less force when the other party 
Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197,1206- has taken an active role in the draft-
S«+ Appendix for Court Citation* and Cross R«f«r«nc*s 
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§ 206 CONTRACTS, SECOND Ch. 9 
ing process, or is particularly knowl- CI. 310, 427 F.2d 722 (1970). None-
edgeable, see Centennial Ent., Inc. theless, one may doubt that the rule 
v. Mansfield Dev. Co., 568 P.2d 50 is "the last one to be resorted to, and 
(Colo. 1977); Crestview Bowl, Inc. v. never to be applied except when 
Womer Constr. Co., 225 Kan. 335, other rules of interpretation fail," 
592P.2d74(1979);Grazianov.Tortora Quad Constr., Inc. v. Wm. A. Smith 
Agency, Inc., 78 Misc.2d 1094, 359 Contr. Co., 534 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 
N.Y.S.2d 489 (Civ. Ct. 1974). As the 1976), quoting (in a diversity case) 
text of the Section makes clear, the from Patterson v. Gage, 11 Colo. 50, 
rule does not apply if the non-drafting 16 P. 560 (1888). 
party's interpretation is unreasona- Comment b. The substance of this 
ble. See Intertherm, Inc. v. Coronet
 C o m m e n t w a s contained in former § 
Imp. Corp., 558 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. Ct.
 236(d) as a qualification of the general 
App. 1977), quoting fromthis Com-
 r u l e c o n c e r n ing terms prescribed by 
ment in Tentative Draft; Perry and j a w 
Wallis, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct. 
§ 2 0 7 . Interpretation Favoring the Public 
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a 
promise or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning 
that serves the public interest is generally preferred. 
Comment: 
a. Scope. The rule preferring an interpretation which favors an 
interest of the public applies only to agreements which affect a public 
interest. It is a rule of legal effect as well as interpretation, and rests 
more on considerations of public policy than on the probable intention 
of the parties. It has often been relied on to justify narrow construc-
tion of a grant of a public franchise or an agreement for a tax exemp-
tion. In general, it does not prefer the interest of a governmental 
agency as a party to a contract; government contracts are likely to be 
construed against the government as the drafting party. 
Illustration: 
1. A is employed by B as an inventor. In an agreement 
settling their disputes on termination of the employment, A prom-
ises to assign to B all A's rights in amending patent application 
and all improvements on the invention covered. Thereafter A 
makes an invention and applies for a patent, and B claims it as an 
improvement. The public interest in encouraging invention sup-
ports an interpretation of the agreement excluding future im-
provements unless future improvements were specifically in-
cluded. 
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